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The Constituent Objectives of
Development-Zimbabwe Case Study
The law is not simply an instrument for dispute resolution. By facilitating
or negating particular activity it also assists in the creation of its environment
and forms part of the cultural hegemony at both the state and international
levels. Consequently the relationship between the law and political economy
is strong. At the state level specific laws are required to implement and
support policy and to enhance or modify existing power structures. The same
applies at the international level, albeit that the distinction between law and
political economy may be harder to draw in the international context. This
is especially true of the evolving right to development,' which is not recognized
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1. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 2; The Limburg Princi-
ples on the Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
reprinted in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DEVELOPMENT 425-51 (Paul De Waart et al. eds., 1988);
Declaration on the Right to Development, U.N. GADR 3d Comm., 41st Sess., 97th plen. mtg.,
arts. 1 & 2, U.N. Doc. A/Res/41/128 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.N.Y.B. 717 [hereafter G.A. Res.
41/128]; Organization for African Unity, African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights arts. 1,
2 & 22, in 21 I.L.M. § 58-68 (1982); INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, DECLARATION ON THE
PROGaRESSIVE DEVELOPMENT OF PRINCIPLES OF PUBuC INTERNATIONAL LAW RELATING TO A NEW
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as justiciable and hence arguably can only be viewed as a putative rather
than legal right.2
Whatever the current status of the right to development may be, there has
clearly been a parallel evolution in the understanding of what the right might
comprise, and of the appropriate policies and implementation of policies required
to engender development. Traditionally successful development has been mea-
sured by increase in the gross national product. Conventional western develop-
ment policy has focused on market liberalization and monetary belt-tightening
to achieve that end. During the 1970s that view was revised and concepts such
as distributive justice and growth with equity began to emerge. However these
goals were never implemented and further revision during the 1980s produced the
current "basic needs" approach. Development is now seen as a people-centered,
equitable process whose preeminent goal is the satisfaction of human need.3
The present course of economic structural adjustment in Zimbabwe4 purportedly
reflects this transformation.
The purpose of this article is to examine the changing perception of the constit-
uent objectives of development as applied in the Republic of Zimbabwe. While
Zimbabwe may be regarded as unique for a number of reasons,5 the key features
of its reform program are currently applied in most countries in sub-Saharan
Africa. 6 It thus affords the opportunity to examine whether the emerging view
of the right to development is yet more rhetoric pregnant with the disappointment
that followed the declaration of the New International Economic Order,7 or
whether it will be fully applied to improve life for the world's majority. The
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER art. 6 (1986); Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States,
U.N. GAOR. 29th Sess., art. 7, U.N. Doc. A/Res/3281 (XXIX) (1974), reprinted in 14 I.L.M.
251, 256 (1975).
2. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 4, at 138 (June 27); see
also Anthony Allott, The Law of Development and the Development of Law, in INTERNATIONAL
LAW OF DEVELOPMENT: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES (Francis Snyder and Peter Slinn eds., 1987).
3. UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME [UNDP], HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORTS:
1990-1992; INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEV. [WORLD BANK], WORLD DEVEL-
OPMENT REPORTS: 1990-1993; WORLD BANK, POVERTY REDUCTION HANDBOOK AND OPERATIONAL
DIRECTIVE (1992); and UNITED NATIONS CHILDREN'S FUND, AFRICA'S RECOVERY IN THE 1990s:
FROM STAGNATION AND ADJUSTMENT TO HUMAN DEVELOPMENT (Giovanni Andrea Cornia et al.
eds., 1992).
4. The policy is set out in ZIMBABWE, A FRAMEWORK FOR ECONOMIC REFORM: 1991-1995
(Government Printer, Harare, Zimbabwe, 1991) [hereafter ZIMBABWE REFORM].
5. These reasons are discussed below, but they are summarized in Masima Taftrenyika, Southern
African Research and Documentation Centre Special Report, in STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT IN ZIM-
BABWE: WILL IT SUCCEED? (Harare, Zimbabwe, June 30, 1991).
6. UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT
REPORT, 1993, OVERVIEW BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF UNCTAD 11 (1993) [hereinafter TRADE
OVERVIEW].
7. Abdur Razzaq Bangladesh, The New International Economic Order 2-5, Workpaper pre-
sented at the Barcelona Conference on the Law of the World, World Jurist Association, Washington,
D.C. (Oct. 6-11, 1991).
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crystalization of the right to development, together with a concrete agenda for
its implementation, are well overdue.
I. The Emerging Right to Development
Etymologically the term "development" is history-less and object-less since
all it implies is some form of positive change. This in itself has made it difficult
to determine, in a practical manner, how best the right to development might
be realized. Moreover, inability to elucidate specific obligations and duties has
been closely allied with the failure to fully integrate the right into the international
legal framework.
The approach to date has been to define the right both individually and collec-
tively. Thus, the United Nations Declaration on the Right to Development (1986)'
provides in Article 1(1) that, "the right to development is an inalienable human
right by virtue of which every human person and all peoples are entitled to
participate in, contribute to, and enjoy economic, social, cultural and political
development, in which all human rights and fundamental freedoms can be fully
realised." 9
This is said by some to reflect a structuralist interpretation of human rights,
which is more concerned with the realization of human rights in general and the
reasons underlying human rights violations.° If this were true, one might expect
that one step further could be taken and that the imbalances of power that help
create and stifle economic development could be addressed. Contemporary no-
tions of development law, however, merely recognize that a link exists between
state prosperity and the satisfaction of the needs of a state's individual members.
The demands of less developed countries to participate more fully in a share of
the world's resources are not answered directly. Rather, the emphasis is upon
state action, given the resources available to the state and obtained from the
international community. While states are obliged to promote the realization of
economic, social, and cultural rights in other states, they do so on the basis of
cooperation and assistance. Thus, global economic structures remain as given.
Consequently, current orthodoxy regarding the appropriate objectives of devel-
opment is similarly constrained. The "basic needs" approach foreshadowed ear-
8. G.A. Res. 41/128, supra note 1.
9. See also INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, supra note 1, art. 6.1, which provides: "The
right to development is a principle of public international law in general and of human rights in
particular, and is based on the right of self-determination of peoples"; and Organization for African
Unity, supra note 1, art. 22, at 62, which provides:
1. All peoples shall have the right to their economic, social and cultural development with due regard to their
freedom and identity and in the equal enjoyment of the common heritage of mankind.
2. States shall have the duty, individually or collectively, to ensure the exercise of the right to development.
10. E.V.O. Dankwa & C. Flinterman, The Significance of the Limburg Principles, in INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 1, at 276; Etienne Richard Mbaya, Relations Between
Individual and Collective Human Rights: The Problem of Rights of Peoples, 46 L. & ST. 7, 21
(1992).
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lier is essentially predicated upon application within a politically pluralist and
liberal economic system. This approach targets areas of human concern such as
health, education, poverty, and nutrition for expenditure priority, while at the
same time implementing market mechanisms to ensure cost-effectiveness in hu-
man investment." The assumption is that with some intervention the market can
be harnessed to assist the poor. This view has firmed with the collapse of the
Communist bloc.
The shift in the balance of world power that followed the collapse of the
Communist bloc has also led to a weakening of the position of the least developed
countries no longer courted in a political battle between the West and East, and
resulted in increasing donor control of policy orientation. Coupled with the greater
interdependence of world trade and the decreasing strategic significance of the
supply of raw materials by the least developed countries, the formation of icono-
clast economic policy has become unrealistic. As the economic problems of the
least developed countries have grown, so has the willingness of donors to intro-
duce economic and political conditionalities. Originally these conditions were
short-term economic requirements associated with averting spiralling debt, but
gradually the requirements have encompassed the creation of social programs
and, more recently, the reform of government infrastructure. 1
2
II. Position in Sub-Saharan Africa
In sub-Saharan Africa the International Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment (the World Bank) has been the most significant player in setting the develop-
ment agenda. 3 While other sources of aid and lending for the purposes of develop-
ment may have yielded greater monetary sums, the World Bank, as the chief
source of multilateral finance, has dominated economic and development policy.
Twenty-four sub-Saharan African countries have recently or are currently em-
barking upon economic programs initiated by the World Bank and its sister
institution, the International Monetary Fund (IMF). These programs have been
generically labelled "structural adjustment programs," or SAPS. In Zimbabwe
11. Richard Morgan, Regional Economic Advisor, UNICEF, Eastern and Southern Africa, Tar-
geting Human Development Priorities: Forward Movement in Africa (Nov. 1993) (unpublished paper,
on file in the UNICEF Library, Harare, Zimbabwe).
12. WORLD BANK, SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: FROM CRISIS TO SUSTAINABLE GROWTH (1989) [here-
inafter SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA]; WORLD BANK, THE SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF ADJUSTMENT IN AFRICA:
A POLICY AGENDA ch. 2 (1990) [hereinafter A POLICY AGENDA]; S.D.A. STEERING COMMITTEE, THE
SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF ADJUSTMENT PROGRAM: A GENERAL ASSESSMENT (Aug. 1993) [hereinafter A
GENERAL ASSESSMENT].
13. The World Bank-King ofthe Development Castle, THE COURIER, Sept.-Oct. 1993, at 71-72;
WINSOME J. LESLIE, THE WORLD BANK & STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION IN DEVELOPING COUN-
TRIES: THE CASE OF ZAIRE 5 (1987). Note also the support for World Bank development policy by
Paris Club members in African, Caribbean and Pacific States-European Economic Community:
Final Act, Minutes and Fourth ACP-EEC Convention of Lome (Lome I) arts. 23 & 220, 29 I.L.M.
783 (1990).
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the program is known as ESAP (Economic Structural Adjustment Program). The
key features of the programs are (1) deregulation of the markets for goods,
services, and labor; (2) removal of tariffs and foreign exchange control; (3)
privatization of parastatal enterprise; (4) strict monetary policy to fight inflation;
and (5) enhancement of the agricultural export sector. Measures for reducing
poverty and improving social infrastructure have been integrated into these re-
forms via the Social Dimensions of Adjustment Program.' 4 According to the
World Bank's agenda, this policy was intended to do more than mitigate the
negative effects of structural adjustment. On the contrary, the program was in-
tended to form part of the adjustment process itself.' s During 1991-92, eleven
of the thirteen structural adjustment loans and three of the five sectoral adjustment
loans made by the World Bank contained tranche release conditions dependent
on poverty alleviation. 6 The Social Dimensions of Adjustment Program had a
five-year time span from 1987-92. Now that it has expired, its work has been
carried into the Special Program of Assistance in Africa.
In addition, since the World Bank has indicated that structural adjustment
alone is insufficient to create long-term sustainable development, emphasis on
"capacity building" has increased. 7 This goal is intended to build Africa's capac-
ity to develop itself. It has several facets. Primarily it consists of encouraging
African governments to produce their own development plans. This effort is
supported by the provision of funds for economic studies and research and by
providing funds for training indigenous economic managers and replacing expatri-
ate resident technical assistance. 18 More controversially, it also encompasses a
demand for better governance. This demand applies to every level of government
and requires moving away from a patrimonial bureaucracy and implementing
rewards/sanctions based on performance and merit,' 9 making national govern-
ment more accountable, upholding the rule of law, and encouraging debate and
14. A Poucy AGENDA, supra note 12.
15. Id. at 23.
16. A GENERAL ASSESSMENT, supra note 12, at 55.
17. SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA, supra note 12; Edward V.K. Jaycox, Capacity Building: The Missing
Link in African Development, THE COURIER, Sept.-Oct. 1993, at 73-75.
18. In 1990 the African Capacity Building Foundation was established with US$100 million
from the World Bank, the United Nations Development Program, and the African Development
Bank in Harare for the purpose of training African managers. See Masimba Tafirenyika, World Bank
in Africa: Can the Leopard Change its Spots?, S. AFR. NEWS FEATURES (Harare, Zimbabwe), June
1993. In addition there are plans to move World Bank training programs from the United States and
other Western countries to local African universities and professional training institutions. See Jaycox,
supra note 17, at 74.
19. MAMADOU DIA, A GOVERNANCE APPROACH TO CIVIL SERVICE REFORM IN SUB-SAHARAN
AFRICA (1993) (Tech. Paper No. 225, Aft. Tech. Dep't Ser., World Bank, 1993). In Zimbabwe
the United Nations Development Program and Overseas Development Agency have assisted in setting
up performance management programs and the success of ESAP has been linked to the need to create
an efficient and effective public service. See ZIMBABWE DEP'T OF INFORMATION, PRESS STATEMENT
No. 216/1993 (delivered by John Nkomo, Minister of Pub. Serv., Lab. and Soc. Welfare, Aug.
19, 1993).
SUMMER 1994
390 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
pluralism within society, especially on the local plane. 20 Particularly galling to
a number of World Bank critics is the suggestion that development programs
initiated in the past failed as a result of corruption and political decline. 21
Quite clearly the structural adjustment programs applied in the past ten years
have not managed to deliver notable improvement to the economic and social
conditions of sub-Saharan Africa. 22 It is therefore of significant interest that
Zimbabwe has embraced the structural reform program despite its failure else-
where. Whether the World Bank's shift of focus to a bottom up, people-oriented
form of development policy will redress these failures and lead to success in
Zimbabwe may therefore be a matter of unrequited hope. Nevertheless, the gov-
ernment is firmly resolved that the program will deliver all that it promises.
III. Zimbabwe
Compared with other countries that have embarked upon structural reform
programs, Zimbabwe has a well-developed manufacturing sector, prosperous
commercial farming, considerable mineral wealth, and relatively good infrastruc-
ture.23 Nevertheless, economic growth has been modest and inequities among
Zimbabweans have been widening. Moreover, the economic structures of Zim-
babwe's colonial past remain little changed. Half of the land remains concentrated
among approximately 4000 white farmers while over 1,000,000 black families
crowd onto poor quality communal lands.24 Similar imbalances prevail in the
commercial and industrial sectors.25
Following the collapse of UD126 in 1980, the current government led by Robert
Mugabe and the ZANU (Zimbabwean African National Union) Peoples' Party
took over a highly regulated and inward looking economy that had been subject
to international sanctions for over a decade. Most of the controls implemented
by the colonial regime were maintained in order to redress the unequal colonial
legacy. Prices for consumer goods were controlled, labor markets were highly
regulated, foreign exchange shortage was solved by administrative allocation,
and parastatals were expanded. Despite the government's socialist platform, these
controls and the increasing bureaucracy that accompanied them tended to preserve
20. SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA, supra note 12.
21. See, e.g., Bjorn Beckman, Empowerment or Repression? The World Bank and the Politics
of African Adjustment, XVI AFR. DEV. 45-72 (1991).
22. Giovanni Andrea Cornia, Is Adjustment Conducive to Long Term Development? The Case
of Africa in the 1980s, UNICEF, INNOCENTI OCCASIONAL PAPERS, EPS No. 21, Oct. 1991, at 23-27;
TRADE OVERVIEW, supra note 6, at 11-12.
23. ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE UNIT, COUNTRY PROFILE: ZIMBABWE, 1991-1992 (1992).
24. ZIMBABWE REFORM, supra note 4, at 17.
25. P.G. KADENGE ET AL., ZIMBABWE'S STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMME: THE FIRST
YEAR EXPERIENCE 2-3 (1992).
26. The UDI period began with the Unilateral Declaration of Independence by the white minority
government led by Ian Smith in 1965. Prior to the declaration, Zimbabwe, then known as Rhodesia,
had been a British colony.
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the existing colonial edifice. In addition, the terms of the Lancaster House
agreement, which had led to the peaceful solution between the UDI government
and the black liberation forces, prevented property expropriation for up to ten
years. Consequently the economy remained dualized along racial lines with a
wealthy white enclave and a subsistence economy for the black majority. How-
ever, while unable to address the structural deficiencies, the government did
make notable advances in education, health, rural development, and income im-
provement. Between 1980 and 1989 primary school enrollments increased by I
million and secondary school enrolments by approximately 600,00027 (Zimbab-
we's total population is approximately 7.5 million). During the same decade, in
health, the number of children fully immunized had tripled, infant mortality had
decreased from 86 to 61 per 1000 births, and life expectancy had increased from
55 to 59 years.28 In rural development the small farmers' share of marketed maize
rose from 0 in 1980 to just over 70 percent in 1989.29
A number of factors combined that led the government to change direction
and liberalize the economy. The economy had experienced modest growth, but
this growth did not keep pace with increases in population. Officially, unemploy-
ment rose to 27 percent. 30 Further, most of the new jobs that were created were
in education, health, and public administration. Investment declined partly be-
cause of the shortage of foreign exchange, which inhibited improvement or expan-
sion of existing plants, and partly because of the wariness of new foreign investors.
As a result of the expansion of social services, in 1990 government spending
amounted to 40 percent of GDP and the budget deficit rose to US$10.4 billion.3'
Zimbabwe's balance of payments also showed a deficit of Z$249 million,32 which
was exacerbated by spiraling foreign debt. In 1980 Zimbabwe's total foreign
debt was US$786 million. By 1990 it had risen to US$3 billion.
Apart from Zimbabwe's economic difficulties, the end of the 1980s accom-
pained a world-wide ideological shift to market economics. Zimbabwe was not
immune from this trend and, like other developing countries, could not pursue
policies in splendid isolation. According to the primary government manifesto
on ESAP:
33
The fundamental objective of economic reform in Zimbabwe is to improve living condi-
tions, especially for the poorest groups. This means increasing real incomes and lowering
unemployment, by generating sustained higher economic growth. In order to achieve
this primary objective, the economy needs to be transformed to make it more competitive
and productive. This transformation entails moving away from a highly regulated econ-
27. ZIMBABWE REFORM, supra note 4, at 1.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Unofficially, unemployment was regarded as much higher. See PETER BALLEIS, A CRITICAL
GUIDE To ESAP 11 (Mambo Press in association with Silveira House, Harare, Zimbabwe, 1993).
31. Id. at 12.
32. Id. at 13. The current exchange rate for Zimbabwe dollars is approximately Z$7.5 per US$1.
33. ZIMBABWE REFORM, supra note 4, para. 13.
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omy to one where market forces are allowed to play a more decisive role, while concur-
rently taking steps to alleviate any transitional social hardships which may arise from
this transition.
The Zimbabwean Government set a five-year time span to implement the reform
program. In order to achieve the desired transition the government needed to
attract US$3.4 billion in foreign funds. The World Bank organized a special
donors' conference, held in Paris in March 1991. The conference strongly en-
dorsed the Zimbabwean Government's plans and pledged US$700 million for
1991-92.
The government's agenda for reform addressed a number of key economic
goals, the achievement of which can only be regarded as interstitial. Implementa-
tion of ESAP has also been adversely affected by drought. The 1992 drought
was the worst experienced by Zimbabwe in over 100 years, and during that year
gross domestic product fell by 8 percent. By itself, agricultural output fell by
35 percent. 34 Following good rains at the end of 1992 and during 1993 it appears,
however, that the economy is recovering and that some of the promised aims of
ESAP will be realized.
IV. Elements of Reform
Trade liberalization constituted one of the fundamental targets of reform. Origi-
nally the government planned to gradually expand the Open General Import
Licence (OGIL) scheme 35 so that by 1995 all items would be importable. By this
means industry would be supplied with the necessary input to increase investment
and expand exports, and domestic industry would be forced to become more
competitive. At the same time tariffs would be used to protect local industry,
but these were intended to be reduced over time.36 Initially, basic components
of the packaging industry, textile industry, and cement production were placed
on the OGIL. By July 1993 about 20 percent of imports were on unrestricted
OGIL.37
To promote exports necessary to sustain the liberated imports and pay off
foreign borrowings, the government significantly upgraded its Export Retention
Scheme. Initially, if a firm increased its export earnings it could retain between
5 and 7 percent of the foreign exchange generated by the overseas transactions
for its own use. By early 1993 firms were permitted to retain up to 50 percent
of their export earnings.38
1993 also saw the introduction of the foreign currency denominated account
34. ZIMBABWE: BUDGET STATEMENT, 1993 (1993).
35. Control of Goods (Open General Import License) Notice 1991, Stat. Inst. No. 249 (1991)
(Zimbabwe) (as amended).
36. E.g., Customs and Excise (Suspension) Regulations of 1993, Stat. Inst. No. 2 (1993) (Zim-
babwe).
37. ZIMBABWE: BUDGET STATEMENT, 1993, para. 10 (1993).
38. Id.
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(FCDA) for local and foreign individual investors, which enables individuals to
hold foreign currency and earn nontaxable interest for three years at rates applica-
ble in world markets. These accounts enable the sale of foreign currency at a
market determined rate, which in November 1993 stood at between 30 and 35
percent above the official exchange rate. 39 Between July and November 1993
about US$30 million had come into Zimbabwe from funds previously held
abroad. 40 There are plans to extend the FCDAs to corporate accounts in early
1994 and eventually use these to replace the Export Retention Scheme, OGIL,
and the remnants of the foreign currency allocation scheme. This step will effec-
tively lead to a floating of the Zimbabwean dollar . 4 Consequently the Zimbab-
wean dollar is likely to devalue by 20 to 25 percent, which, while beneficial for
exports, will add to domestic inflation and cause additional hardship to the average
Zimbabwean consumer.42
Investment was another key target of deregulation. Prior to the implementation
of the reform program, several bureaucratic approvals were required in order
to sanction new projects. In 1992 the government established the Zimbabwe
Investment Centre (ZIC), 43 whose function was to expedite approval of investment
projects by providing a single-window clearance agency for both foreign and
domestic investors. When applying its discretion the ZIC is directed to give
priority to projects benefiting rural areas, projects enabling the international
transfer of advanced technology, projects generating substantial employment op-
portunities, projects increasing productivity, projects improving the balance of
payments, and projects involving substantial research and development expendi-
ture.
44
The Zimbabwean Stock Exchange was also given a boost by a relaxation of
the rules in relation to foreign investment. The relaxation of these rules repre-
sented quite a turnaround from the decision of the government in 1984 to suspend
all external dealings on the exchange pending acquisition by the Reserve Bank
of Zimbabwe of all shares represented in external currency. Under the new rules
local and foreign investors can purchase shares on the exchange using funds from
their FCDAs. Foreign investors using foreign exchange are permitted to invest
on the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange with a restriction that only 5 percent of the
39. Savvas Kyriakides, From a Jack to a King, S. AFR. ECONOMIST, Nov. 1993, at 37.
40. Funny Mushava, Personal Foreign Funds Bring in over $200, Bus. HERALD (Harare, Zim-
babwe), Nov. 18, 1993.
41. Hatred Zenenga, Proposed Corporate FCDAs a Positive Step, Say Dealers, Bus. HERALD
(Harare, Zimbabwe), Nov. 4, 1993.
42. As a result of the reform program and drought, inflation shot up to 42% in 1992 and lowered
to 28% in 1993. John Robertson, Economic Structural Adjustment Programme and its Impact on
Financial Stability and Balance of Payments Position, Paper Presented at the On the Road to a Market
Based Economy Conference, organized by the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in conjunction with
The Southern African Foundation for Economic Research, Harare, Zimbabwe (Nov. 3-5, 1993).
43. Zimbabwe Investment Centre Act, No. 16 (1992).
44. Id. § 19.
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shares of Zimbabwean companies listed can be purchased per investor and that
collectively only 25 percent of the entire issued share capital can be owned by
non-Zimbabweans. 45 Dividends and capital gains therefrom are freely remittable
less any taxes due. From January 1994 capital gains tax will be reduced from
30 to 10 percent and the tax on dividends will be reduced from 20 to 15 percent.4
Since over 66 percent of existing listed companies were already beyond the 25
percent threshold, the new rules have had a successful impact. Trading activity
on the exchange following introduction of the rules doubled, and the Zimbabwean
Industrial Index has risen by over 70 percent in U.S. dollar terms. 47 While foreign
investment coming into companies already listed on the exchange is unlikely to
lead to the establishment of new businesses and thus create new employment
opportunities, the moneys can be used to lower existing debt-to-equity ratios and
thus assist with the balance of payments position. These funds can also be used
to rejuvenate and reequip factory stocks, which due to the previous shortages
of foreign exchange had been allowed to deteriorate.
To further encourage investment Zimbabwe became a signatory to the World
Bank Convention Establishing the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, 8
an organization that issues guarantees for international finance against non-
commercial risks and provides a forum for policy cooperation in investment
matters between capital importing and exporting countries. Zimbabwe also signed
protocols with the Overseas Private Investment Corporation in order to assuage
any doubts that might be raised by prospective foreign investors.
Small business investment has also been a target for reform. The Law Develop-
ment Commission of Zimbabwe 49 has recommended the enactment of a bill pro-
viding for the simple and easy formation of small closely held corporations.
The bill is currently before the Zimbabwean Parliament.50 It is hoped that the
implementation of a simpler method of incorporation and less formal regulation of
private corporations will encourage additional investment from the small business
sector.
Lending at concessional rates is available to small businesses through the Small
Enterprise Development Corporation, and, at the government's behest, several
other financial institutions have made a number of facilities available to assist
small business. For instance, the Zimbabwe Development Bank has in place a
Z$30 million line of credit for the procurement of capital equipment. 5' Further,
45. STAND. CHARTERED AFR. Q. REV., Apr. 1993, at 16 (regulations unavailable from the
government printer at the time of writing).
46. ZIMBABWE: BUDGET STATEMENT, 1993, para. 77 (1993).
47. Kyriakides, supra note 39, at 37.
48. 24 I.L.M. 1598 (1985).
49. LAW DEVELOPMENT COMM'N OF ZIMBABWE, INTERIM REPORT ON PROPOSED NEW PRIVATE
BUSINESS CORPORATIONS BILL, Report No. 5 (Jan. 1990).
50. Bill unavailable from the government printer at time of writing.
51. ZIMBABWE, THE PROMOTION OF INVESTMENT: POLICY AND REGULATIONS para. 34 (Sept.
1991).
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the Reserve Bank has also been operating a facility for medium scale exporters
that supplies pre- and post-export finance at concessional rates.52
Market forces have been given further play through the relaxation of price
and distribution controls. Until 1990 the government had imposed price controls
to ensure the supply of basic commodities at affordable prices, to increase rural
incomes, and to minimize restrictive trade practices. Gradually these controls
have been lifted so that the market now determines the price of goods. The
impact of the relaxation of price controls, together with the measures designed
to liberalize trade, was highly inflationary. In January 1993 inflation stood at
45 percent.5 3 Food was the most significant component of that figure, especially
for basic commodities like meat and maize. When the control of bread prices
was repealed54 in March 1993 and the price of bread rose 300 percent over the
next six months, riots broke out on the streets of Harare.
Coupled with the removal of price controls the government has also decon-
trolled the agricultural marketing boards, so that they effectively remain residual
buyers of the products in which they previously held a marketing monopoly.
Prior to the advent of the reforms, output in the regulated agricultural sector had
been gradually declining" due to low producer prices and stagnation in technol-
ogy. On the other hand, output and trade in noncontrolled commodities like
tobacco had grown. Under the reform program subsidies for agricultural products
were removed and domestic trade in certain commodities (for example, maize)
was deregulated. However, government approval is still required for both imports
and exports. Thus, the export of controlled products (grain, oilseed, cotton, beef,
and dairy products) has remained in the hands of the relevant marketing boards.
There are plans to delink these boards from government control and eventually
make their profits self-sustaining. Already the Dairy Marketing Board operates
in a competitive environment free of government assistance.56 The impact of the
reforms on the agricultural sector has yet to be determined, although clearly they
have affected consumer prices.
A significant problem with reforms of this nature identified in other countries
is that encouragement of the expansion of the agricultural sector does not necessar-
ily lead to greater export earnings since the price elasticity of demand for many
of these products is very low and increases in production throughout the region
52. ZIMBABWE: BUDGET STATEMENT, 1993 (1993).
53. Jessica Woodroffe, Electricity in Ten Years Time-or Survival Now?, VIEWPOINT: CHISTIAN
AID POL'Y UNIT, Mar. 1993.
54. Stat. Inst. No. 127 (1993) (Zimb.).
55. T. Takavarasha & E.A. Attwood, The Performance of the Agricultural Sector under the
Economic Reform Programme and the Agricultural Sector's Role as a Major Foreign Currency
Earner to Finance this Programme, Paper Presented at the On the Road to a Market Based Economy
Conference, organized by the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in conjunction with The Southern Africa
Foundation for Economic Research, Harare, Zimbabwe (Nov. 3-5, 1993).
56. Id. at 15.
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tend to offset any profit gains. 57 To this end a Project Implementation Committee
has been formed between members of the Southern African Development Com-
munity, Preferential Trade Area, and the Indian Ocean Community, at the instiga-
tion of the World Bank and a consortium of multilateral donors, to coordinate
implementation of the SAPS in the Southern African region. One of the functions
of this group will be to ensure that trade policies are coordinated and that efficient
patterns of growth will be created.5"
In line with the suspension of price controls and the dismantling of monopoly
markets, the labor market has also been deregulated. Instead of direct intervention
in wage setting, the government has introduced regulations59 permitting collective
bargaining between workers and their employers subject to statutory minimum
wages well below prevailing market rates. Labor disputes are now governed by
employment councils that have gradually been established industry by industry.
The employment councils have been given significant powers in relation to suspen-
sion and discipline of employees during labor disputes and are thus involved in
the regulation as well as the resolution of disputes.
As a rule, since the introduction of ESAP, wages have not kept pace with
price rises. 6° The new methods of wage-fixing and dispute settlement appear to
have undermined a previously strong labor movement, especially in the wake
of rising unemployment. 6 Falling real wages have added pressure to the difficult-
ies faced by ordinary householders.
The reform of public enterprises or parastatals was planned in order to reduce
the government deficit and also make the markets in which they operate more
competitive. Insofar as ESAP is concerned, in this area the government has failed
to achieve notable reform and in fact appears to be going in reverse. Historically
parastatals in Zimbabwe have operated at sizeable losses significantly affecting
priorities in government spending. Furthermore, most have been forced to bor-
row, thus exacerbating balance of payments problems. As part of its reform
program the government promised to commercialize many of the parastatals that
were not maintaining essential social services. To that end the government has
increased the domestic price of Zimbabwe Iron and Steel Company's products to
import parity; granted Air Zimbabwe autonomy to set domestic prices; increased
electricity tariffs; and removed the monopoly position of a number of agricultural
marketing boards. However, reduction of the size of the parastatals and the
consequent drain they place on the public purse, together with a reduction in the
57. Cornia, supra note 22, at 32.
58. Bethuel Setai, Carrying the SAP Further, S. AFR. POL. & ECON. MONTHLY, Aug.-Sept.
1993, at 28.
59. Labour Relations (General Relations) Regulations, Stat. Inst. No. 31 (1993) (Zimb.); and
Labour Relations (Settlement of Disputes) Regulations, Stat. Inst. No. 30 (1993) (Zimb.).
60. Woodroffe, supra note 53, at 13-14.
61. Lloyd M. Sachikonye, The New Labour Regime Under SAP in Zimbabwe, S. AFR. POL. &
ECON. MONTHLY, Feb. 1992, at 41, 43-44.
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civil service, remain outstanding. At the end of November 1993 government
subsidies were expected to exceed Z$1 billion. 62 The target of ESAP was to
reduce losses to Z$340 million.63 Yet no concrete plans exist for disinvestment
other than a broad policy statement to the effect that it would be desirable in a
number of cases. Major restructuring will be required for most of the debt-ridden
parastatals if privatization is to be a success. Plans for such restructuring are
currently underway.
Apart from the reduction in the civil service and the commercialization of the
parastatals, another controversial method for reducing the government deficit
has been the introduction of cost recovery methods for the provision of education
and health services. The social impact of these measures, in particular, has galva-
nized much of the community opposition to the ESAP program. Fees have been
applied for all urban schooling and treatment in hospitals and clinics, except
where monthly income falls below Z$400 per month. (Initially the threshold
figure was Z$150 per month, but this was so low that only the destitute qualified).
The introduction of the cost recovery program conforms to the World Bank's
policy of targeted safety nets to protect those most vulnerable to economic adjust-
ment; however, in hindsight, it appears that the safety nets have been inadequate.
Evidence to date indicates that attendance at hospitals and clinics has declined
and that the poor are most likely to fail to attend for treatment in the event of
illness or injury. 64 In particular there have been startling increases in the number
of babies born before arrival at hospital, which has in turn led to significant
increases in infant and maternal mortalities. The number of maternal deaths
increased by 88 percent between 1989-90 and by 27 percent between 1990-91.65
Similar trends have been experienced in the education sector. During 1992
education costs increased by 43.1 percent, due to the introduction of fees and
increases in the costs of sitting examinations. Increased cost led to reduction in
school attendance, and consequently up to 14 percent fewer children were sitting
"0" level examinations.
66
Apart from increasing costs to the consumer, the quality of education and
health services under ESAP appears to have significantly deteriorated. While
nominal budget spending on these services has been increased, the increases have
62. Government Subsidies Now Put at Over $1 billion, Bus. HERALD (Harare, Zimbabwe), Nov.
25, 1993, at 5.
63. Reforming Public Enterprises, Bus. HERALD (Harare, Zimbabwe), July 16, 1993, at 3.
64. Munhamo Chisvo, Government Spending on Social Services and the Impact of Structural
Adjustment in Zimbabwe 7 (Mar. 1993) (unpublished Consultancy Report produced for UNICEF-
Zimbabwe); BALLEIS, supra note 30, at 27; Woodroffe, supra note 53, at 7-9; ANNE RENFREW,
ESAP & HEALTH (Mambo Press in association with Silveira House, Harare, Zimbabwe, 1992).
65. Chisvo, supra note 64, at 7.
66. Id. at 8. "0" Level examinations refer to the Ordinary Level of the General Certificate of
Education examinations, which is comparable to a high school certificate. There is also an Advanced
Level of the General Certificate of Education.
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been undermined by population growth and high levels of inflation. Real public
funding for health and education has fallen by approximately 25 percent.67
To assist in the amelioration of the impact of ESAP the government established
the Social Dimensions of Adjustment fund. The objectives of the fund are to
provide targeted food subsidies to the poor; to provide relief for school fees for
the children of families identified by the Department of Social Welfare as unable
to pay; and to provide for fee relief for health services for those identified by
the Department of Social Welfare as unable to pay, and to assist retraining of
retrenchees. Initially the fund was set up with Z$20 million seed money. The
fund was supposed to be accessible at the time that ESAP was launched in October
1990. However, funds were not available for distribution until 1992, and even
then were grossly inadequate to cope with the burdens imposed under ESAP.
Within the first six months most of the allocation for health and education had
been spent on education fees, with little remaining for health. Funds allocated
to retrain retrenchees had also not met the burgeoning need. By April 1993 the
Social Dimensions of Adjustment Fund had only retrained 1000 retrenchees,
whereas the actual number of retrenchees was estimated at 20,000.61 Unfortu-
nately, it appears that those most in need of assistance are unable to obtain access.
The procedure to obtain benefits is highly bureaucratic. Applicants have to present
a number of documents (for example, birth certificates and marriage certificates)
and fill out forms. They may have to wait outside social welfare offices for days,
and delays in processing applications for assistance can be interminable. 69
Despite an increase in the allocation of Z$150 million for the Social Dimensions
of Adjustment Fund in the 1993 budget,70 compared with an allocation of Z$1.5
billion for defense, 7 the government does not appear to be giving social needs
a high priority. At best the Social Dimensions of Adjustment Fund offers little
more than an inadequate compensatory measure to offset some of the worst effects
of ESAP. When compared with total budget strategy, social welfare cannot be
regarded, as the World Bank claims it should be, as an integral part of the
adjustment program. At the moment the Social Dimensions of Adjustment policy
is based on the assumption that the costs of adjustment are of a transitory nature
only. Clearly, however, areas such as illiteracy, health, and food security will
affect long-term sustainable development. To ensure that the basic needs approach
to development is implemented much more effort is required.
The United Nations Children's Fund and the United Nation Development Pro-
gram (UNDP)72 have suggested that one method of really making social need an
67. Id. at 5.
68. Woodroffe, supra note 53, at 16.
69. Id. at 15.
70. ZIMBABWE: BUDGET STATEMENT, 1993, para. 51 (1993).
71. Id. para. 48.
72. UNICEF, Structural Adjustment in Zimbabwe: Protecting the Vulnerable through Adversity
(1992) (unpublished statement available from UNICEF, Harare, Zimbabwe); UNDP, HUMAN DEVEL-
OPMENT REPORT: 1993, Overview at 7-8.
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integral part of Zimbabwe's development program would be to increase and
retarget official development aid. In 1992 only 2.6 percent of the total of such
aid was directed to priority human sectors. It has been suggested that this should
be increased globally to at least 20 percent.
V. Development Indicators
At this stage the economic indicators for Zimbabwe have been largely negative.
Inflation is high (although falling consistently), unemployment remains a central
problem, and the introduction of tight credit policies and high interest rates to
control inflation have led to disinvestment. The devastating drought of 1992
has also had a negative effect. With the recovery of the agricultural sector the
government hopes to make gains in export growth and reduction in food imports.3
Nevertheless, the government deficit continues to grow and the balance of pay-
ments position remains negative.
Economists generally regard the government's current policies as an essential
first phase for introducing measures that will actually achieve structural adjust-
ment and sustainable development. 7 4 The process of trade liberalization, by itself,
has not, and will not, lead to economic restructuring. Rather than strengthening
the economy, the process of trade liberalization has rendered it vulnerable to the
world competitive environment. By itself, trade liberalization has merely served
to reinforce existing inequities and has further dualized the economy along racial
lines. In supporting an export-oriented white enclave, the promise of development
for the whole community remains unfulfilled.
ESAP needs to be complemented by more strategic planning to develop and
restructure the Zimbabwean economy. Successful economies such as Japan and
South Korea indicate that the government can and should play an interventionist
role in the growth process. Continuing to roll back the state apparatus has not
proven to be a successful formula for development. A crucial priority will be
to focus upon the key assets of the productive system (for example, the question
of land reform that is currently the subject of a constitutional battle before the
courts). Further, if the development is to be sustainable, human needs will need
to be addressed in a far more comprehensive manner. For example, greater
priority on education will be required to produce a skilled labor force capable
of diversifying the economy. A healthy population is also essential for economic
growth.
73. ZIMBABWE: BUDGET STATEMENT, 1993, para. 7 (1993).
74. Tom Mswaka, Does Zimbabwe Need an Economic Structural Adjustment Programme?,
Paper Presented at the On the Road to a Market Based Economy Conference, organized by the
Konrad Adenauer Foundation in conjunction with The Southern Africa Foundation for Economic
Research, Harare, Zimbabwe (Nov. 3-5, 1993); Fay Chung, ESAP Not Yet Proven To Be a Successful
Development Strategy, THE SUNDAY MAIL (Harare, Zimbabwe), Sept. 19, 1993, at 8 & 11.
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VI. Conclusion
The model of trade liberalization and deregulation formulated by the World
Bank and applied by the Government of Zimbabwe does not address the goal
of eradicating structural inequality, nor does it appear to lead to sustainable
development. Despite government statements that indicate commitment to human
investment, the basic needs approach has not been implemented. Current ideology
requires certain macro and micro economic conditions to be created in order for
the basic needs approach to be effective. However, the creation of those conditions
is not a sufficient development goal by itself. The World Bank, donors and other
international organizations such as the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development and the UNDP are clearly aware of that certitude.
The situation calls for stronger commitment to the basic needs approach from
the international community, from international aid and finance organizations,
and from the individual state. This committment may follow if the right to develop-
ment has a more certain place within the international legal framework.
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